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whole face perception
Romke Rouw
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Neurophysiology Laboratory, Faculty of Medicine, Universite de
Louvain-La-Neuve, Belgium
We studied intact and impaired processes in a prosopagnosic patient (RP). In
Experiment 1, RP showed an inversion superiority effect with both faces and
objects, with better performance when stimuli were presented upside down than
in normal upright orientation. In Experiment 2, we studied the effect of face con-
figuration directly by comparing matching performance with normal vs. scram-
bled faces. RP was worse with normal than with scrambled faces, whereas
normal controls showed an advantage of a good face context. In Experiment 3,
RP showed interference from external face features on the evaluation of internal
face features. These results indicate, first, that although RP is impaired in face
recognition and face matching, he does still encode the whole face rather than
relying completely on parts-based procedures. Second, RP has a deficit at the
level of the configural processes involved in finding subtle differences between
individual faces, as his performance is worse when presented with a normal face
configuration than with scrambled or inverted faces.
Prosopagnosia is a rare disorder in which a patient is selectively impaired in
recognizing familiar faces. Prosopagnosic patients have not lost the ability to
recognize a person per se: they are still able to recognize a person by voice or a
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particular piece of clothing. This impairment in face recognition can extend to a
problem with unfamiliar face matching as well. The specificity of the face
impairment (Bodamer, 1947) has raised the intriguing question of what is
“special” about recognizing faces.
One explanation of prosopagnosia is based on the notion that face recogni-
tion depends strongly on certain face specific processes, which function differ-
ently and independently from other visual recognition processes. By definition,
a deficit of these processes then impairs the recognition of faces much more
than the recognition of other (object) stimuli. One such proposal (Biederman &
Kalocsai, 1997; Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1998) hypothesizes that faces
are represented in a relatively holistic manner (representations have little part
representation), whereas object recognition is more parts based (parts are
explicitly represented). In this view, impaired face recognition reflects
impaired “holistic” representations, whereas objects can still be recognized by
alternative (parts-based) processes.
An older proposal states that prosopagnosia is caused by a general loss of
“configural processing” (Levine & Calvanio, 1989). The ability to recognize
individual features is contrasted with an inability to get an overview of suffi-
cient features of a stimulus to allow the structuring of a coherent percept, which
is specifically reflected in impaired face processing.
A different explanation of prosopagnosia is based on the assumption that the
processes involved in face recognition depend on particular stimulus properties
rather than on stimulus class. Thus, faces are only special in their particular
combination of stimulus properties. Damasio, Damasio, and Van Hoesen
(1982) advanced what Moscovitch, Winocur, and Behrmann (1997) called the
“individuation hypothesis”. According to this hypothesis, prosopagnosic
patients are impaired at making fine discriminations necessary to see the subtle
differences between exemplars of the same category. Therefore,
prosopagnosics are impaired at recognizing individual faces, but can still dif-
ferentiate between object classes (e.g., a chair from a table). The proper control
task for individual face recognition would therefore be one requiring individual
object recognition. Studies on prosopagnosic patients’ performance on
within-class recognition of stimuli other than faces led to mixed results. Some
studies report that prosopagnosic patients did show a problem with recognition
of birds (Bornstein, 1963), or cows (Bornstein, Sroka, & Munitz, 1969). Other
reports, however, show prosopagnosic patients with unimpaired recognition
of sheep (McNeil & Warrington, 1993), cows and dogs (Bruyer et al., 1983),
and common objects such as chairs and glasses (Farah, Levinson, & Klein,
1995).
In another version of the “stimulus properties” explanation there are two
main factors that underlie the processes involved in face recognition, not only
the factor of within-class recognition but also the expertise we hold for faces.
Carey and Diamond (1994; Diamond & Carey, 1986) distinguish first-order
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relational information (the spatial relations between parts) and second-order
relational information (variations of these spatial relations relative to the
common face configuration). Due to specific properties of facial stimuli,
namely our expertise with faces combined with the fact that faces have a shared
configuration, second-order relational information is of crucial importance in
face discrimination and identification. This notion is in line with the argument
(Damasio et al., 1982; Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; Gauthier, Skudlarski, Gore, &
Anderson, 2000) that the specificity of processes involved in face recognition
does not relate to the stimulus class, but rather results from the combination of
subordinate (within-class) level matching task combined with a sufficient
degree of expertise the observer holds for the stimuli. In this line of thought,
normal observers use their expertise with the face configuration in order to
achieve good performance in making the subtle discriminations between
different individual faces. Furthermore, prosopagnosia occurs when this ability
is somehow not available.
In this report, we did not set out to study the degree to which processes
involved in face recognition are special to this stimulus class only. Rather, we
examined in more detail which processes are involved in face recognition and
which of these processes were spared or impaired processes in prosopagnosic
patient RP. An intriguing insight on spared and impaired processes in
prosopagnosia is provided by recent reports on prosopagnosic patients who
show not just a loss of the normal pattern of performance, but an effect opposite
from the effect found with normal controls. Farah, Wilson, Drain, and Tanaka
(1995) presented prosopagnosic patient LH with upright and inverted faces.
Normal controls show in this task faster and better matching of upright than
inverted faces. Prosopagnosic patient LH, however, paradoxically performed
better at matching inverted faces than upright faces. Farah, Wilson et al.
reasoned that LH has intact parts-based processing with objects, whereas
mandatory holistic face processes were impaired. Therefore, LH applies
impaired holistic processes when presented with faces. Disturbing the face con-
figuration (by inverting the face) provides LH with the possibility to rely on
(intact) parts-based processes.
The reasoning (described above) explaining prosopagnosia as a deficit in
making subtle within-class discriminations provides a different explanation for
the findings by Farah, Wilson et al. LH tries to apply configural processes
normally involved finding the subtle differences between normal (upright)
faces as well as individual objects. These processes are particularly useful for
normal controls, but LH fails. In support of this explanation, we recently
studied LH (De Gelder & Rouw, 2000b) and not only replicated Farah’s finding
with inverted and upright faces, but also found an inversion superiority effect in
a within-category matching task with objects (shoes and houses).
As becomes clear from the descriptions provided earlier, there seems to be a
general consensus on the specific importance of “configural” (or “holistic”)
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information for face recognition, whereas objects can also be recognized in a
parts-based or featural manner. In fact, the very good performance normally
shown with recognizing or matching a face stimulus is often discussed as if it
were the same issue as that of relative dependence on a certain manner of pro-
cessing. But in this paper we set out to examine separately on the one hand the
influence of a face configuration on matching performance and on the other
hand the issue of relative dependence on “whole-based” vs. “parts-based” pro-
cesses. We will first specify the terms used in this paper, and specify what these
terms refer to, as different terms and definitions co-exist in the literature.
We use the terms “whole-based” vs. “parts-based” to refer to a manner of
processing. Note that if a stimulus is processed as a whole rather than in terms
of its parts, this still provides no information of what constitutes the “whole”.
Thus, “whole-based processing” (as contrasted with “parts-based processing”)
can mean that there is relatively little parts representation (“holistic”) of the
stimulus, or alternatively, that rather than information on the parts themselves,
the relations between the parts (“configural”) information, “first-order
relational” information) are critical. To avoid confusion, we reserved the term
“configuration” to refer to the presence of a specific stimulus property (namely,
a normal face configuration). We will study both issues in prosopagnosic
patient RP. First, we will study how the presence of a face (as compared with
very similar stimuli but lacking the right configuration) influences his perfor-
mance level. Second, we study whether RP’s impaired face recognition
performance implies that only parts-based processing is still intact.
In the first experiment, we present prosopagnosic patient RP with a face
inversion task similar to that of Farah, Wilson et al. (1995), and include object
stimuli as was previously done with AD (De Gelder, Bachoud-Levi, & Degos,
1998) and with LH (De Gelder & Rouw, 2000b). The task was also presented to
normal controls. The normal controls are tested with the same task to ascertain
that the expected effects can be obtained with our materials and task settings.
However, we do not compare normal performance and RP’s performance on
each separate condition. Understandably, a patient with brain damage can show
overall slower and worse performance than normal controls but we examine the
pattern of performance that emerges from comparing the different conditions in
one experiment.
In all experiments both accuracy and latency were measured. In many clini-
cal studies, accuracy but not latency is reported which entails the problems that
effects in response time as well as possible trade-off effects cannot be detected.
Carefully chosen instructions are important to find the right balance between
these two measurements. Therefore, instructions stressed both speed and
accuracy and indicated that the measuring of response times still implies that
RP (and controls) should at all times try to find the right answer.
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CASE DESCRIPTION
Patient RP is a 49-year-old man who has lost the ability to recognize faces as a
consequence of a head trauma that occurred when he was seven years old. His
intellectual abilities are above average and he does not suffer from any known
visual dysfunction. As is to be expected in cases caused by closed head injury
(see for example CK; Moscovitch et al., 1997) an MRI scan did not yield evi-
dence of brain damage (see De Gelder & Kanwisher, 1999). As can be seen in
Appendix I, RP’s problem in visual recognition is specific to faces and extends
to problems with unfamiliar faces. RP obtained a low score (31/54) on the
Benton-Van Allen face test (Benton & Van Allen, 1968) and on the Warrington
test (32/50; Warrington, 1984). Object recognition is unimpaired: RP showed
good performance on the Boston naming test (56/60) as well as on the
Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) picture naming test (115 /120).
RP also failed to recognize well-known stimuli cartoon characters (2/26) but
four times correctly identified the animal on which the cartoon figure was based
(for example, pig head for Miss Piggy) (Moscovitch et al., 1997).
EXPERIMENT 1: NORMALLY ORIENTED AND
INVERTED FACES
RP’s performance on matching upright stimuli was compared with his per-
formance with inverted stimuli (presented upside down). The experiment con-
sisted of a whole stimuli matching task and a whole-to-part matching task.
Whereas in the whole stimuli matching task a strategy of looking at the whole
stimulus seems most efficient, presenting a whole-to-part task encourages a
parts-based strategy.
The tasks were designed such that the level of categorization is the same
with face and object stimuli; matching exemplars of unfamiliar faces (exem-
plars of the category “face”) and matching of unfamiliar objects of the same
category (e.g., exemplars of the category “shoe”). In both tasks, the faces and
objects were presented in upright as well as inverted orientation. Stimulus pre-
sentation and data acquisition were performed with a computer. Latency as
well as accuracy were recorded, such that a possible speed–accuracy trade-off
can be detected.
In line with earlier findings (De Gelder & Rouw, 2000a) we expected that
RP shows worse performance with normal face configuration than with stimuli
in which this configuration is disturbed. In contrast, if RP’s face recognition
problem is accompanied by parts-based processing, little effect of configura-
tion is expected.
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Participants . Sixteen students from Tilburg University received course
credit to serve as normal controls.
Materials. The stimuli consisted of faces and pairs of shoes (Experiment
1A) and faces, face parts, houses, and house parts (Experiment 1B). Thirty-two
faces (16 male) were photographed with a Canon Still Video Camera RC-560
on a Video Floppy Disc VF-50. Photographs were prepared as grayscale pic-
tures with an image processing and production program (Aldus Photo Styler)
for presentation on a monitor.
Faces of 16 (8 male) models were photographed in frontal view and
three-quarters orientation. Sixteen models (eight male) were photographed
only in three-quarters orientation to serve as distractor stimuli. Similarly, 16
pairs of shoes (8 male shoes) were photographed in frontal view (i.e., with the
tip of the shoe pointing toward the camera) and in three-quarters orientation (tip
turned in horizontal plane to the side of camera). Another 16 pairs of shoes were
photographed only in three-quarters orientation.
With the same apparatus, frontal view photographs of houses were taken and
subsequently computer edited to grayscale pictures. One prototypical picture
of a house was selected to be used as framework. Only the roof and outer con-
tour was left intact, the rest of the house was filled with an uniform grey colour.
With the computer image-editing program, eight different houses were created
by placing different sets of inner features (a door and two windows) from eight
other photographed houses in the outer contour. The features were always in an
identical configuration such that house contour and location of the three inner
house features were always the same. Thus, eight house stimuli differed only in
which features were used as three inner features. For Experiment 1B, part stim-
uli were created by presenting the door/window (for the houses) and the
eyes/mouth (for the faces) in isolation. The same stimulus material and a
similar design was used in previous studies (De Gelder et al., 1998; De Gelder
& Rouw, 2000a).
Viewing distance was approximately 50 cm, so that the stimuli subtended
between 7 and 8° of visual angle for length and width. In all experiments stimuli
were presented to RP on a 12" screen of a Pentium laptop PC (Compaq Armada
4150), and to the normal participants on the 14" screen of an Olivetti desktop
(M4 74 modulo). Stimulus presentation and response recording was piloted by
Me12 software allowing for millisecond timing.
Experiment 1A: Wholes matching task
Design. Pictures of faces and pairs of shoes served as stimuli (see Appen-
dices II and III for examples). Eight male and eight female faces and eight male
and eight female pairs of shoes were combined with the three-quarters view of
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that same face/shoe and a different face/shoe. The 16 face and 16 shoe stimulus
combinations were presented both in upright and in inverted orientation. Pre-
sentation was blocked by the two within-subject factors: stimulus class (face
vs. shoe) and stimulus orientation (upright vs. inverted), with random trial pre-
sentation within a block. The experiment (four blocks) was presented twice in
opposite block order to normal controls. Although the effects were significant
with the controls, we feared that presenting only 32 trials per experiment to RP
(since in this case there is only one participant) would create a too small range
of possible errors (16 for guessing and 32 perfect score). Therefore, the experi-
ment was presented a third time to RP.
Thus, RP saw a total of 192 (48 per condition) trials, and the normal controls
saw a total of 128 (32 per condition) trials. For both normals and RP a block pre-
sented for the first time (first experiment) started with four practice trials with
feedback.
Procedure. Before the start of each block, both accuracy and speed were
stressed. A trial started with a warning signal, followed after 500 ms by presen-
tation of the frontal pictures for 2500 ms. After a 2500 ms delay (during which
the screen was black), the three-quarters view target and three-quarters view
distractor were presented. RP and the control participants were instructed to
choose as fast as possible whether the left or right face/shoes was the same as
the one they had seen previously, and to indicate their choice by pressing the
corresponding key on the response box in front of them. Probes disappeared at
key press. After 600 ms the next trial started.
Results. Latencies more than 2.5 times standard deviation from the mean
RT were treated as outliers for both RP (3.1% of data) and normal controls
(maximally 6 per person, which is 4.7%). A maximum response time of 3 s was
set for normal controls.
Controls performed much better with upright than inverted faces, both in
accuracy, F(1, 15) = 66.19, p < .001, and latency, F(1, 15) = 21.6, p < .001.
Interestingly, they also showed faster performance with upright than inverted
shoes, F(1, 15) = 7.15, p < .05. As Table 1 shows, RP shows a pattern of
impaired upright face matching as compared with inverted face matching in
accuracy though this effect is not-significant (32/48 vs. 37/48), c2(1) = 1.29, p =
.26, and further RP showed a non-significant face inversion superiority in
latency (3431 ms vs. 3377 ms), t(1, 67) = 0.09, p = .93. Similarly, inverted shoes
were matched faster (2220 ms vs. 1727 ms), t(1, 85) = 1.36, p = .18, and slightly
better (44/48 vs. 43/48 correct) than inverted shoes, but again these effects did
not reach significance.
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Experiment 1B: Wholes to part matching task
Design. Stimuli were the faces, face parts, houses (see Appendix IV for an
example), and house parts as described previously. Each of the eight faces was
combined with two eye probes, as well as with two mouth probes. One probe
was the same pair of eyes or mouth and the other part probe was pair of eyes or
mouth from another face. Similarly, the houses were combined with the same
attic window or door, and another attic window or door. These 16 face and
16 house stimuli combinations were presented both in upright and in inverted
orientation. Thus there were, as in Experiment 1A, two within-subject factors:
Stimulus class (face vs. house) and stimulus orientation (upright vs. inverted).
Presentation was blocked by stimulus class and orientation, with random trial
presentation within a block. Further details on the design were as in
Experiment 1A.
Procedure. In this task we wished to encourage parts-based matching
rather than whole-based matching. Therefore, we presented RP with a
whole-to-parts matching task. Further, in the previous experiment we pre-
sented shoes as they might resemble faces in the fact that individual shoes can
be distinguished on the basis of general shape information. In the next experi-
ment, we presented object stimuli with clearly discernable and identifiable
parts. Therefore, we used the houses, as described earlier, that have a similar
house outline and only differ in two features: attic window and door.
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TABLE 1
Faces and shoes matching: Upright and inverted
Percentage Mean RT
Stimuli (number) correct (ms)
RP
Faces
Upright 67% (32/48) 3431
Inverted 77% (37/48) 3377
Shoes
Upright 92% (44/48) 2220








Comparisons significant at p < .05 are indicated with **.
Whole stimuli were pictures of faces and houses (Appendix IV), whereas
part stimuli were the eyes or mouth presented in isolation without the face con-
text, or the door or upper window without the house context (see also descrip-
tion of materials).
In Experiment 1A, a frontal view target was followed by three-quarters view
probes, as rotation of the face requires some global shape information and
therefore would encourage whole-based rather than parts-based processing.
For this same reason, Experiment 1B necessarily presents both whole target
and part probes in frontal view. This way, a strategy of analysing the target by
selectively processing a feature (eyes and mouth) is encouraged as it would lead
to optimal performance.
Again, the target appeared for 2500 ms, followed after a 2500 ms delay by
the two part probes. Further materials, procedure, and design were as described
in Experiment I A.
Results. As in Experiment 1A, for both normal controls and RP responses
longer than 2.5 standard deviations from the mean of the experiment were
treated as outliers. Control participants had maximally four outliers per experi-
ment (3.1%) and RP had four outliers (2.1%). In this experiment controls did
not show an effect of orientation, for neither faces nor houses. Patient RP again
shows an advantage with inverted stimuli. RP had a significantly better (22/48
vs. 34/48), c2 = 6.17, p < .025, performance with inverted than upright faces.
The difference in response time is non-significant (a difference of 228 ms, stan-
dard deviations are 1274 ms and 1330 ms) as indicated by a t-test, t(1, 54) =
0.64, p = .53. RP further showed an interesting effect in accuracy (see Table 2)
of better performance with inverted than upright presented houses (28/48 vs.
37/48 correct), c2(1) = 3.86, p < .05. Responses were also slower with upright
houses, but again this difference is non-significant, t(1, 63) = 0.56, p = .57.
Discussion
In contrast with controls, RP did not show the normal inversion inferiority
effect. Instead, RP showed an inversion superiority effect; a better performance
when faces are presented upside down than when they are upright. These
results indicate clearly that RP does not simply rely on parts-based analysis.
Indeed, if RP would completely disregard the whole stimulus and depend only
on analysis of the separate face parts, similar performance would be expected
on upright and inverted faces. Farah, Wilson et al. (1995) concluded that a simi-
lar finding in an inversion study with prosopagnosic patient LH indicated man-
datory use of a malfunctioning “face module”. This idea on the special case of
faces rests on what is probably a too strong division between object and face
recognition processes, as we found that prosopagnosic patient LH also shows
inversion superiority with objects as stimuli (De Gelder & Rouw, 2000b). With
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this new case of prosopagnosic patient RP, we again find inversion superiority
with faces as well as with objects (houses). Rather than proposing an impaired
face module, we suggest that the inversion superiority effect reflects impaired
use of configural processes that are involved in face recognition as well as rec-
ognition of certain classes of objects.
In our next experiments, we wished to further explore the ideas described
previously on spared and impaired visual processes in prosopagnosic patient
RP. There are two factors in Experiment 1 that need clarification. The first con-
cerns the comparison between the two tasks. RP showed a pattern of inversion
superiority in both tasks, but it only reached significance in the task encourag-
ing parts-based processing rather than the task encouraging wholes-based pro-
cessing. As it seems logical to expect that the influence of configuration is
stronger in the task encouraging whole-based processing, this finding seems
unexpected.
However, a direct comparison of performance level between the tasks is not
valid given the settings and materials of Experiment 1. In this experiment,
whole faces were completely different. Thus, although there are several cues in
the wholes matching task (a mole, hairline), in the whole-to-part matching
task the right answer can only be found in either the eyes or the mouth. Perhaps
the additional information aided performance in the upright face condition,
decreasing the difference between upright and inverted condition. In the next
experiment, we will adapt the materials such that the two tasks are more
comparable.
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TABLE 2
Faces and houses matching: Upright and inverted
Percentage Mean RT
Stimuli (number) correct (ms)
RP
Faces
Upright 46% (22/48) 2270
Inverted 71% (34/48)** 2497
Houses
Upright 58% (28/48) 3645








Comparisons significant at p < .05 are indicated with **.
The second factor concerns the comparison between upright and inverted
face performance. We used this comparison to study the influence of face con-
figuration on task performance. Although this is a widely excepted paradigm,
there might be an additional effect of rotation influencing matching perfor-
mance with inverted faces (for example, a face might be “mentally righted”
before it can be recognized; Rock, 1974). A similar effect of rotation might
influence matching performance with inverted face parts. In our next experi-
ment, we take out this factor of rotation and present upright whole faces and
face parts. The configuration of the faces is disturbed in the “scrambled faces”
where face parts are put at the wrong location. Comparing a “good” and “bad”
face configuration allows us to directly examine the influence of face configu-
ration on matching performance.
EXPERIMENT 2: FACE CONTEXT EFFECT WITH
WHOLE OR PART PROBES
Striking demonstrations of the influence of stimulus configuration on the per-
ception of its constituent parts are the “word superiority effect” and the “object
superiority effect”. These reflect, respectively, better recognition of a letter in
the context of a word (Reicher, 1969), and better recognition of a line in context
of a good form (Weisstein & Harris, 1974). Homa, Haver, and Schwartz (1976)
found superior recognition performance when face parts were presented in the
context of a normal whole face, as compared with the context of a scrambled
(displaced features) face. These effects are not just obtained under threshold
conditions, as Davidoff and Donnelly (1990) extended superiority effects to
normal exposure conditions. In our previous experiment, we found that RP
showed a specific disadvantage when presented with a normal face configura-
tion as compared with a stimulus in which this configural information is
assumed lost (inverted face). In our next experiment, we will try to replicate this
finding by comparing a normal face configuration with a stimulus in which
only this configuration has been disturbed, by displacing the face features
(scrambled face). Thus, our first hypothesis is that an intact face configuration
has a detrimental effect on RP’s recognition performance.
Tanaka and Farah (1993) presented either a whole stimulus or a stimulus
part in a recognition task, and found that face recognition, as compared with
object (houses) recognition specifically profits from the presence of a whole
stimulus. Indeed, these authors state that what separates face recognition from
object recognition is relative little part representation with faces, as compared
with objects. In a recent study, Donnelly and Davidoff (1999) examined the
advantage of presenting a complete probe (wholes matching task) over a part
probe (wholes-to-part matching task) with both face and house stimuli. They
found a Complete Probe Advantage (CPA) with both faces and houses, and
concluded that both kinds of stimuli were processed as a whole rather than in
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terms of their parts. Here we will examine the issue of whole-based vs.
parts-based processing separately from the effect that an intact face configura-
tion has on recognition performance.
First, we study the face superiority effect, which is the advantage (better per-
formance) provided by the presence of a good face configuration. Therefore,
we present facial stimuli differing only in face parts (eyes and mouth) and com-
pare recognition performance when stimuli present a good (normal face) vs. a
bad (scrambled face) context. Normal controls are expected to show the advan-
tage with the normal face configuration as compared with the scrambled faces,
as found previously by Davidoff and Donnelly (1990). RP, on the other hand, is
not expected to profit from the good face context. In Experiment 1 RP showed
better recognition performance if the face configuration is made less accessible
(by inverting the face). In this experiment we directly disturb the face configu-
ration by dislocating the face features. We expect to replicate the finding that
RP’s performance level decreases when presented with a “good” (nominal)
face configuration.
Furthermore, we presented both a whole-to-whole matching task (WW) and
a whole-to-part matching task (WP). In both tasks, performance with normal
face stimuli is compared with performance with scrambled face stimuli. A sec-
ond question, then, is whether we will find a CPA such as reported by Donnelly
and Davidoff (1999). However, as these authors state, the presence or absence
of a CPA might depend on several task (e.g., presentation time) and stimulus
(e.g., complexity of the stimulus) settings. We did not vary these determinants
and therefore cannot draw conclusions on what constitutes the CPA. The differ-
ence between WW and WP task performance is simply seen as an indication
of relative whole-based vs. more parts-based processing, but the experiment
was not set up to examine the conditions in which a CPA might appear or
disappear.
Control participants and RP performed the same experiment. Again (see
Experiment 1) we are interested in RP’s pattern of performance as compared
with the pattern of performance of normal controls, rather than a direct compar-
ison between RP and normal controls on each condition.
Participants . Twenty students from Tilburg University received course
credit for participating in the experiment. As in Experiment 1, we tested a group
of control participants, to establish what effects were obtained with these mate-
rials and to replicate findings as reported in the literature.
Materials. A prototype face outline was created from a black and white
(photographic quality) picture of a young Caucasian male. One of six pairs of
eyes and one of six mouths were digitally inserted into the face template, either
at the correct positions creating six normal faces (for an example see Appendix
V) or with the eyes located at the position of the mouth and vice versa, creating
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six “scrambled” faces (see Appendix VI). Thus, the “whole faces” stimuli dif-
fered only in eye and mouth. The six pairs of eyes and six mouths could also be
presented in isolation. Each (normal, scrambled) face measured 6 × 8 cm. The
viewing distance was 50 cm; thus the faces subtended approximately 7 × 9° of
visual angle.
Design. A two-alternative forced-choice matching task was used. In the
wholes matching task (WW task) a whole face target was followed by two
whole face probes, one identical and one different from the target. In the
whole-to-parts matching task (WP task) presentation of the whole face was fol-
lowed by that of two pair of eyes or two mouths; one same and one different to
the face parts presented in the whole face target.
As described earlier, we created six different faces by placing one of six eyes
and one of six mouths in a standard face framework. Each face was combined
with the correct probe (same face/face part) and an incorrect probe (one of the
five other faces/face parts). We presented each of these combinations of tar-
get/probes (five incorrect probes for each of the six faces), making 30 trials per
condition. In 15 out of these 30 cases, the correct probe was on the left side.
We studied the effect of within-subject factor stimulus type (normal vs.
scrambled face) in both the wholes matching and the whole-to-part matching
task. Trials were blocked by task and stimulus type, with random trial order
within a block. Each block was split in two and block order was balanced
within-subject. The block started with four practice trials, but only when a
certain condition was presented for the first time.
Procedure. A trial started with an 800 ms warning signal. The test stimu-
lus appeared for 1000 ms, followed after a 1000 ms delay by a two-alternative
forced choice of two part probes or two whole probes presented side by side.
Normal participants responded by pressing the rightmost or leftmost key on a
response box. The next trial started after a key press.
RP and normal controls were tested with the same procedure and materials,
but RP indicated his choice by pressing one of two labelled keys on the key-
board, indicating “left” (“q”) or “right” (“}”). These keys were chosen as RP
indicated them as most comfortable. All blocks started with an instruction, pre-
sented both on the computer screen and read aloud to RP by the experimenter
(to ascertain that RP understood the task). As in Experiment 1 both speed and
accuracy were stressed.
Results
One participant showed chance performance in two out of four conditions and
was excluded from analyses. All other normal controls showed at least 67%
correct per condition. Some of RP’s latencies were much longer than his
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average response times. We excluded latencies more than three times the stan-
dard deviation from the mean from analysis (excluding 4% of the responses).
Repeated measure analyses showed that normal controls showed the
expected face context effect: Controls recognized normal faces faster than
scrambled faces in the wholes matching task, F(1, 18) = 4.57, p < .05. This
effect was not present in the whole-to-part matching task, F(1, 18) = 0.53,
p = .48. The effects in accuracy are very small (indeed, normal controls made
very few errors) and an ANOVA on the effect of stimulus type (normal vs.
scrambled) provides an F value of less than 1 for both tasks. An indication of
whole-based processing was provided by an overall advantage of wholes
matching (WW) task, both in latency, F(1, 18) = 25.77, p < .001 and accuracy,
F(1, 18) = 30.59, p < .001, over the whole-to-part matching (WP) task (see
Table 3).
Interestingly, RP also showed significantly better performance on the WW
(50/60) than on the WP (39/60) task, c2(1) = 5.26, p = .02. The answers were
also faster but this effect was non-significant, t(87) = 0.7, p = .48. As can be
seen in Table 3, this pattern of more errors and longer latencies in the WP vs.
WW task was found in each stimulus condition (both normal and scrambled
faces). RP did show a context effect, but in contrast with normal controls RP
showed no normal face configuration advantage. Instead, performance with
normal faces was slightly worse, and significantly slower (separate variances
t-test for equality of means: t(69) = 2.23, p = .05) than scrambled face per-
formance (see Table 3). Analysing the two tasks separately shows that the
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TABLE 3
Context effect in a wholes matching (WW) task and
whole-to-part machine (WP) task
Percentage Mean RT
Stimuli (number) correct (ms)
RP
WW
Normal 80% (24/30) 1676**
Scrambled 87% (26/30) 1210
WP
Normal 63% (19/30) 1824








Comparisons significant at p < .05 are indicated with **.
context effect was just significant in the wholes matching (WW) task, t(48) =
2.0, p = .05, but not in whole-to-part matching (WP) task.
Discussion
As in Experiment 1, RP showed a pattern of performance opposite to that of
normal controls. Control participants showed the same effects as reported pre-
viously by Davidoff and Donnelly (1990) and Donnelly and Davidoff (1999),
better recognition with normal than with scrambled face context. RP, on the
other hand, showed a paradoxical pattern of worse performance with normal
than scrambled faces. This worse performance with normal faces could not
have been found if RP depends on parts-based procedures. Normal and scram-
bled faces only differ in the location of the features, therefore RP’s differential
performance on normal vs. scrambled faces indicates processing of
“whole-based” or “relational” information.
In contrast with the previous experiment, in this experiment the tasks were
more similar in overall difficulty as little extra information was given in the
WW as compared with the WP task. This was done to make possible a better
comparison between tasks. A surprising finding is that RP still shows the
advantage of the wholes matching task over whole-to-part matching task, just
as normals did. One possible explanation is that more information is present in
wholes-matching, as both a different eye and different mouth are present in the
foil distractor, while only one feature probe is present in the WP task.1 Another,
a bit counterintuitive, explanation is an advantage of whole-based over
parts-based processing for RP. Logically, the ability to process the whole stim-
ulus is more important in the wholes matching task than in the whole-to-part
matching task. At the moment, we cannot conclude whether RP’s performance
indeed is better with whole-based rather than parts-based processes. We can
conclude, however, that RP shows a face disadvantage effect using
whole-based rather than parts-based procedures. Normals show, as expected,
that the face superiority effect is present in the wholes matching task but not in
the whole-to-part task. For RP, in this experiment the face inferiority effect was
significant in the wholes matching task (encouraging whole-based procedures)
but not in the whole-to-part matching task. Although an alternative explanation
can be given for RP’s overall better performance on the wholes matching task
than on the whole-to-part task, this does not explain why his normal face disad-
vantage would be found in a task encouraging whole-based processes rather
than in a whole-to-part task encouraging parts-based procedures.
Prosopagnosic patients are expected to have a problem with “the whole
face” and would instead rely on “parts-based analysis”, but RP’s case does not
conform to this expectation. His pattern of performance suggests that the
WHOLE FACE PROCESSING IN PROSOPAGNOSIA 703
1
We thank N. Donnelly for pointing out this alternative explanation to us.
presence of a normal face configuration disturbs rather than improves his per-
formance, indicating whole-based rather than parts-based procedures. In the
General Discussion we will return to these issues in relation to ideas and find-
ings presented in face recognition literature. In the next experiment we will try
to find further support for RP’s intact “whole face encoding”. Furthermore, we
will examine what is included in the “whole face”.
EXPERIMENT 3: ENCODING THE WHOLE FACE
In this experiment, we studied RP’s “whole face processing” in a new and dif-
ferent manner by examining whether both external and internal facial features
are included. We designed a task in which only the inner face features are to be
compared, whereas hair and hairline should be ignored. Thus, the relative
importance of the whole face as compared with some inner feature registration
can be contrasted. If RP relies on analysis of inner features, differences in hair
should not disturb his matching performance. However, if RP encodes “the
whole”, and this whole picture includes both the internal and external features,
hair and hairline will influence his recognition of inner face features.
Materials. Black and white pictures of photographic quality from twelve
faces (six male and six female) served as the basis. These were the same pic-
tures used to create the stimuli of Experiment 1. Each face was paired with a
same-sex other face that differed only minimally in easy cues such as hairstyle
and overall face shape. With a photo-editing computer program (Adobe
Photoshop), hair of the two faces in a pair was switched, thus creating two
“new” faces from each face pair. The resulting sets of four faces each resulted in
a total of 24 face stimuli. As can be seen in Appendix VII, the “swapped hair”
faces were carefully edited to look like natural faces.
Design. There were six sets of four faces (two original faces and two
“swapped hair” faces) each. In a trial, each face was combined with each of the
four faces in its set, creating 16 trials per set and 96 trials in the whole experi-
ment. A target face could be followed by itself, the other (paired) face, the same
face but with different hair, or a different face with the same hair. Thus there
were two within-subject factors, answer category (“same” or “different” face)
and hair congruency (“congruent” or “incongruent” with the correct answer).
The four combinations per target face were presented for each of the 24 faces,
therefore there were 24 trials in each condition. The total of trials was divided
in two blocks: Participants first saw a block with male faces, and after a
short break a second block with female faces. Within each block, trials were
randomized.
704 ROUW AND DE GELDER
Procedure. Participants received an explicit instruction to ignore the hair
and respond to the inner face only. Two faces, presented in sequence, were
compared. Two keys of a response box (keys on the keyboard for RP as in the
previous experiments) were labelled “same” and “different”. A trial consisted
of 1 s presentation of a face, followed, after a 1 s delay, by the face probe. The
second face disappeared after key-press. After 800 ms, the next trial started.
Several measures were taken to ascertain that the instructions were under-
stood by RP. Instructions were read aloud, and RP was encouraged to ask ques-
tions. It was stressed that only the face itself should be compared. Without
mentioning that the hair had been swapped, it was said that hair was unimpor-
tant in reaching the right answer and should be ignored. Furthermore, both for
RP and the control participants the experiment started with 16 practice trials (4
from each condition) with feedback.
Participants were seated approximately 50 cm from the computer screen
(size of the faces subtended a visual angle of 5.1° horizontal by 6.3° vertical)
and responded by pressing one of two keys of a response box, labelled “same”
and “different”. As in the previous experiments, instructions encouraged to
provide an answer as fast as possible, although it was stressed that at all times
participants should try to find the correct answer.
Results
Normal controls showed an interfering effect of hair and hairline, when it was
incongruent with the right answer, in latency, F(1, 19) = 79.34, p < .001, as well
as in accuracy, F(1, 19) = 38.10, p < .001. The interference effect is particularly
manifest in “same” response condition (see Table 4): If the whole face probe is
the same, mean percentage correct is 96%, but this percentage decreases to 76%
correct if the hair is different, F(1, 19) = 40.16, p < .001. The effect of incongru-
ent hair was also measured in longer response times, both in “same”, F(1, 19) =
39.84, p < .001, and in “different”, F(1, 19) = 4.5, p < .05, trials.
As with the normal controls, incongruent hair disturbed RP’s performance.
Overall, this effect is significant in accuracy, c2(1) = 9.50, p = .002, but not in
latency, t(64) = 1.44, p = .15. As can be seen in Table 4, “same” responses were
fast (1457 ms) and had high accuracy (96% correct) if the whole face was same.
A difference was found between this same face/same hair condition and the
condition of same face/different hair, as the latter condition showed
non-significant longer response times (2011 ms), t(34) = 1.88, p = .07, and
more errors (54% correct), c2(1) = 11.11, p < .001. A disturbing effect of hair
was observed, but was not significant, c2(1) = 1.42, p = .23, in the “different”
trials: Congruent hair gives quite good performance (71% with 1816 ms mean
response time), whereas a different face with same hair results in chance
performance (54% with 2261 ms mean response time).
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Discussion
Our position that RP still encodes “the whole” stimulus rather than relying
completely on “face parts analysis” is supported again with this different para-
digm. The findings furthermore indicate that both internal and external face
features are included in this “whole face processing” by RP. An incongruent
external feature does disturb his performance, even when explicitly instructed
to match internal features only.
One might argue that RP performs worse with incongruent external features
because he did not follow instructions and based his judgements on hair instead
of on the inner face features. However, this explanation is highly unlikely. First,
we provided extensive instructions and practice trials to ensure that RP would
be looking at the inner features of the face. Second, if RP judged the hair
instead of the face, RP’s performance would approach zero percent correct in
incongruent trials (judging the hair and therefore providing the wrong answer
for the face). This effect was not found: In those cases where inner and outer
features provided conflicting answer categories RP’s performance dropped
to chance but did not approach zero. This chance performance was in sharp
contrast with his quite good performance if external and inner features had con-
gruent answer categories. Another alternative explanation might be that RP
processes features separately, but cannot focus on (or attend to) the inner
features due to a dominating role of the hair (e.g., “more” or “easier” informa-
tion). However, judging outer features would again lead to a 0% rather than
a 50% score on incongruent trials. We conclude that RP’s patterns of
results show interference from hair, rather than judgement based on hair. An
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TABLE 4
Interference from incongruent hair
Percentage Mean RT
Stimuli (number) correct (ms)
RP
Same face
Same hair 96% (23/24) 1457
Different hair 54% (13/24)** 2011
Different face
Different hair 71% (17/24) 1816
Same hair 54% (13/24) 2261
Controls
Same face
Same hair 96% 877
Different hair 76%** 1044**
Different face
Different hair 94% 922
Same hair 92% 958**
Comparisons significant at p < .05 are indicated with **.
explanation based on a problem in directing attention is also not plausible given
RP’s further pattern of performance, particularly his good performance on
tasks examining low-level visual processes (see Appendix I). Finally, note that
in this as in the previous experiments RP is compared with himself rather than
directly with normal controls. All alternative explanations on possible differ-
ences between RP and controls based on RP’s generally worse performance
cannot explain RP’s pattern of performance: A clear advantage of “congruent
hair” trials over “incongruent hair” trials.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In Experiment 1 RP showed, in contrast with normal controls, worse per-
formance with upright faces than with faces presented in inverted orientation.
Furthermore, “this inversion superiority effect” was observed not only with
faces but also with object stimuli, as found previously with agnosic patient AD
(De Gelder et al., 1998) and prosopagnosic patient LH (De Gelder & Rouw,
2000b). RP’s impaired performance when presented with a normal face config-
uration was repeated and extended in Experiment 2. RP showed inferior perfor-
mance finding subtle differences between faces in a good (normal) face context
as compared with a disturbed (scrambled) face configuration. Normal controls,
however, did show superior performance with the good face context. This con-
tradicts the older notion (e.g., Levine & Calvanio, 1989) that impaired face pro-
cessing is accompanied by dependence on parts-based analysis. Experiment 3
confirmed this notion and furthermore showed that both internal and external
features are included in this “whole face” representation. In a task of matching
inner face features, an incongruent external feature (prompting a different
answer than the inner features) greatly disturbs RP’s performance.
Face configuration vs. whole-based processing
The results from these three experiments converge in showing that RP does still
process the whole face. But at the same time the presence of a face configura-
tion disturbs rather than improves his performance. This seems contradictory,
as in the past the two notions “whole-based processing” and “face configura-
tion” have often been looked upon as closely connected or even as two ways to
describe the same intact face mechanism (Tanaka & Farah, 1993). Therefore,
the main conclusion from these findings with prosopagnosic patient RP is that a
strict division between “whole-based” face recognition processes on the one
hand, and “parts-based” object recognition processes on the other hand does
not provide a correct picture.
The distinction between “whole-based” information vs. “face configura-
tion” information described earlier calls to mind Carey and Diamond’s descrip-
tion of “first order relational information” vs. “second order relational
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information” (as described in the introduction to this paper). First order rela-
tional information specifies the relations between the stimulus parts and is con-
trasted with information of the isolated face parts, and is assumed sufficient to
recognize a stimulus category (e.g., “a car” or “a face”). Recognition of individ-
ual faces, however, depends also on second-order relational information (spec-
ifying an individual by describing how it relates to the shared configuration of
all faces). To the present data, this description of two different kinds of
“configural” information related to face recognition is very valuable. Indeed,
patient RP provides for the first time a prosopagnosic case description that
clearly supports this distinction between two kinds of information. RP’s perfor-
mance suffers from the presence of second order relational information: Worse
performance with normal than inverted (Experiment 1) or scrambled (Experi-
ment 2) faces. Simultaneously, RP shows no disturbance of first order rela-
tional information (RP does not depend on parts-based processing). The
important difference between the previous (Carey and Diamond) model and
our findings lies in the fact that RP’s “whole-based” processing is found in
tasks at the level of individual face matching, rather than face detection or cate-
gorization. Thus, also for face recognition (identification), relative dependence
on the whole face or face parts, should be examined separately from the influ-
ence of an intact vs. impaired face configuration.
We studied the degree of parts-based processing on a task of individual face
matching as we had strong indications that the processes involved in the two
tasks, face detection or categorization vs. individual face recognition, are not
equal (Schweich & Bruyer, 1993). For example, Ellis (1986) suggested that
face decision, but not face recognition, is based upon an automatic analysis.
Furthermore, in an earlier study we contrasted recognition performance of two
prosopagnosic patients RP and AV (De Gelder & Rouw, 2000a). Whereas
patient RP showed worse performance with a normal face configuration,
patient AV showed no effect of face configuration (equal performance with
upright and inverted faces) and seemed to depend on parts-based processes. In
contrast, both patients were excellent on a face categorization and face detec-
tion task, even in a speeded face detection task that did not allow a featural
analysis. These findings suggest that the functioning of “whole-based” vs.
“parts-based” processes should be examined separately in the case of face deci-
sion and the case of face identification.
RP’s impaired face recognition
Our matching experiments were designed such that good matching per-
formance would depend on the ability to find subtle differences between indi-
vidual faces. Indeed, RP showed a specific disadvantage with a “good face
configuration”, suggesting that the configural processes involved in this dis-
crimination were impaired. The finding of an inversion superiority effect with
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objects indicated that these processes are also involved in recognition of certain
classes of objects. So far, we have given little theoretical consideration of what
representation or processes underlie the processing of the “good face configu-
ration” of unfamiliar faces. We did not test one model of face recognition
against another. Whether faces depend on configural relations as compared
with a face norm (Rhodes, Brennan, & Carey, 1987), or are stored as exemplars
in “face space” (Valentine, 1991), or are individuated relative to their “proto-
type”, or shared configuration (Diamond & Carey, 1986), does not make a dif-
ference for the conclusions drawn from our results. The results do indicate,
however, that RP’s worse performance with a good face configuration is
related to making subtle within-category comparisons, rather than to
“face-specific” processes.
Furthermore, the within-category comparison rather than the expertise we
hold for faces seems an important factor in RP’s deviant pattern of per-
formance. An explanation based merely on the expertise we hold for faces does
not provide an explanation for our findings, as the inversion superiority effect
was also found with objects. These stimuli were new to RP and he had no spe-
cific expertise for shoes or houses.
It is interesting to contrast our findings with those of Davidoff and Landis
(1990), who found no difference between prosopagnosic’s performance on
normal vs. scrambled faces. The authors concluded that the patients had a gen-
eral (not face-specific) impairment in forming integrated temporary represen-
tations. These temporary representations were contrasted with representations
formed “through object specific routines”; thereby forming integrated higher
level representations for objects (or faces), but not for scrambled objects. As
Davidoff and Donnelly (1990) noted, the difference between a scrambled face
and a normal face is that only the latter can use this “higher order” information.
In contrast with the patients studied by Davidoff and Landis, RP’s problem
does not lie in temporary representations, which would mean a similar problem
with faces, objects, and non-objects (scrambled or inverted stimuli). RP, how-
ever, has a clear disadvantage with stimuli containing the “higher order” infor-
mation of face class, and showed better performance with non-objects than
with faces or objects. Another difference between our study and that of
Davidoff and Landis is that as we separated the influence of “face class” from
the relative dependence on whole- vs. parts-based processing, we did not
expect a wholes matching advantage for faces only. We have made clear that
RP’s problem with face recognition is not dependence on parts-based
processes. A next question is then of course what underlies RP’s impaired face
processing.
It is important to note that in this case prosopagnosia is not only a problem in
familiar face recognition (“Face Recognition Units” in the model of Bruce &
Young, 1986). RP is also significantly impaired in unfamiliar face matching.
We studied what visual processes underlie this deficiency and found that RP
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has a problem with those processes involved in finding subtle differences
between individual unknown faces. Though it seems obvious that his problem
with unfamiliar faces is related to his problem in storing and processing of
familiar faces, this study does not examine all processes involved in familiar
face recognition in RP.
One possibility is that besides from his deviant pattern of performance in
matching faces, there is a problem in the storage of familiar faces. Another pos-
sibility is that RP has an additional visual problem, which is specifically dis-
turbing for recognition of faces as compared with other objects. Such additional
problem could for example be a difficulty in surface recognition or curved lines
(Kosslyn, Hamilton, & Bernstein, 1995). Finally, an intriguing idea is that RP’s
specific problem with faces results from the combination of both factors
described in this study. RP has impaired ability to make subtle comparisons
within a stimulus class. Normal participants are aided by the fact that this is a
well-known category and depend on their knowledge of what individuals in
this class roughly look like. RP, however, has an impairment in using this
knowledge. Furthermore, he still processes these stimuli in a whole-based man-
ner, just as normals do. Therefore, his normal use of the face or object configu-
ration is impaired, while simultaneously the alternative route of analysing parts
is blocked. This interaction of two factors might lead to specifically bad per-
formance. For now, the exact interaction between these processes remains
speculation.
What the results do show, in conclusion, is that severely impaired face rec-
ognition does not mean dependence on parts-based analysis. RP can and does
still processes the whole face. Vice versa, intact encoding of the whole stimulus
does not mean intact face expertise: Clearly RP is impaired in face recognition.
We propose that at the level of face identification a distinction should be made
between whole-based vs. parts-based processing on the one hand, and pro-
cesses related to stored information on the face (or object) class on the other.
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APPENDICES
I. Performance of patient RP on standardized visual
processing tasks
1. Low level visual processes
Birmingham Object Recognition Battery (Riddoch & Humphreys, 1993)
RP Normal mean (SD)
line length (test 2) 24/30 (normal) 26.9 (1.6)
size (test 3) 26/30 (normal) 27.3 (2.4)
orientation (test 4) 23/30 (normal) 24.8 (2.6)
gap (test 5) 37/40 (normal) 35.1 (4.0)
minimal feature match (test 7) 22/25 (normal) 23.3 (2.0)
foreshortened views (test 8) 23/25 (normal) 21.6 (2.6)
object decision (test 10B, “hard”) 27/32 (normal) 25.4 (4.7)
2. Object recognition
Boston naming test 56/60 (normal)




Cartoon faces 2/26 (impaired)
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II. Face stimuli of Experiment 1A
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IV. House stimuli of Experiment 1B
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V. Normal face stimuli in wholes matching task of
Experiment 2
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VI. Scrambled face stimuli in wholes matching task
of Experiment 2
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VII. Example of original and changed external
features faces of Experiment 3
